Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard
on the polar traverse
Aude Villemain
a,
, Patrice Godon
b
a
University of Reims, Research Center on Work and Development (CRTD), Laboratory of Ergonomics, CNAM, Paris, France
b
Paul Emile Victor Institute (IPEV), France
article info
Article history:
Received 21 October 2015
Received in revised form 31 January 2016
Accepted 8 March 2016
Available online xxxx
Keywords:
Organizational resilience
Safety management
Polar conditions
Unexpected events
Proactive–reactive adjustments
abstract
The aim of this research is to understand the organizational resilience through the safety management
when unexpected events occurred, on an atypical transport environment, the polar traverse. Three polar
traverses were studied, one of which being a detailed case study. Thus, ethnological observations over
3 year periods from 2012 to 2015 (to understand the traverse logic, functioning through unexpected
event) and all-day interviews during a traverse (to understand actions and strategies of organizational
resilience to cope unforeseen events) were collected. The main results, from quantitative and qualitative
analysis, indicated (1) mechanical, organizational and both interventions allowed to face unexpected
incidents on the traverse, (2) great possibilities to take actions on the convoy organization enabled to
develop a pro-active management of the safety in alternation with reactive adjustments; (3) the impor-
tance was to preserve the machines functionality even if operators have to face environment hostility to
repair; and (4) the variation of the convoy organization was permanent in its whole even if the incidents
concerned only one road track. The strategies of organizational resilience building will be discussed in
this article, around the proactive–reactive management, the organizational dynamic, the risk evaluation,
and the risk taken to preserve the room manoeuver.
Ó 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The term « resilience » can sometimes, in certain cases, be
reserved for the management of unexpected disturbances « which
exceed the anticipated areas of adaptation » (Lundberg and
Johansson, 2006, 2007; Woods, 2006, 2009). A system is resilient
if workers adapt themselves by understanding the context in
which adaptation takes place. Adjustments are thus constantly
made by individuals and organization, even if they are more often
approximate rather than exact (Hollnagel, 2012). Every organiza-
tion is stretched to operate at its full capacity and, to be resilient,
a system needs to be able to anticipate whatever may happen,
monitor what is going on, respond effectively when something
happens, and learn from past experiences (Hollnagel, 2009;
Woods and Cook, 2002; Woods and Hollnagel, 2006). Conse-
quently, the organizational resilience strategies are questioned to
understand how a system could adjust itself to disturbances or
unexpected hazard.
One of the main objective of researches focused on the strate-
gies of organizational resilience is to understand the organizational
preconditions conducive to a safe performance (Pidgeon and
O’Leary, 2000). Some studies emphasized the need for proactive
measures in safety management, while proactive manner invested
in safety and resource allocations to safety improvement are key
factors in ensuring a resilient organization (Dekker et al., 2008).
Reactive adjustments are, by far, the most common ones. Short
terms responses are not enough to guarantee a system’s safety
and survivability. One reason for this is that the system can only
be prepared to respond to a limited set of events or conditions
and over a limited period of time. The reactive approach quickly
appears too restrictive (Daniellou et al., 2009; Hale and Heijer,
2006), as this new way of conceiving safety is of little interest if
it only reacts to events and does not anticipate them (Dekker,
2006; Hollnagel and Woods, 2006; Westrum, 2006). Consequently,
the proactive vision of resilience is therefore essential when aimed
at the prevention and adaptation of a system to changing condi-
tions prior to the occurrence of undesirable events (Hollnagel,
2006, 2008, 2009; Leveson et al., 2006; Morel et al., 2008;
Westrum, 2006; Woods and Hollnagel, 2006). Proactive adjust-
ments, however, mean that the system can change from a state
of normal operation to a state of readiness before something
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008
0925-7535/Ó 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Corresponding author at: University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, UFR STAPS,
Campus Moulin de la Housse, Bât. 25, Chemin des Rouliers, BP 1036 - 51 687 REIMS
Cedex 2, France.
E-mail address: aude.villemain@univ-reims.fr (A. Villemain).
Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci
Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008
happens. In this case, resources are allocated to match the require-
ments of the expected event and special functions may be acti-
vated. The Safety Management System (SMS) is interested in this
problematic, considering the fact that organizational and manage-
ment factors have to be taken into account to understand human
contribution to major accidents (Hale and Hovden, 1998). SMS is
the most efficient way of allocative resources for safety regarding
which organization plays a major role. Supplementary resources
are mobilized and local strategies are deployed to cope with distur-
bances. This is « opportunistic bricolage » which is a way to offset
the disturbances and maintain the functioning of the system at
the lowest possible level of risk. It is a safety measure deployed
by human expertise, as well as the use of specific individual and
collective skills in real time, as previous studies in polar context
have already shown (Villemain and Lémonie, 2014; Villemain
and Godon, 2015).
Studies focused on extreme situation at work are poor in the
ergonomics approach, and even more so in polar context. Few
researches in polar conditions have been led in a logistics thematic
in arctic (Lièvre, 2007). At the present time, only our researches on
working conditions in the Antarctic context working are being car-
ried out with an ergonomics approach (Villemain and Lémonie,
2014; Villemain and Godon, 2015). To conduct research in such
conditions requires a specific methodology to collect data because
of the harsh conditions. Subsequently, the ethnographical method
is the most appropriate to the ground constraints (Rix-Lièvre and
Lièvre, 2010). These authors used this kind of method in order to
study ski polar expeditions in arctic through ethnological observa-
tions and interviews.
The context and motivations of this research are particular and
require to be specified. The French polar traverse, initiated in 1993,
was followed by the creation of the scientific French–Italian station
on the Antarctic continent called Concordia (situated to 1150 km
from the French station Dumont D’Urville (DDU) and opened in
2005). At that time, the objective was to design a freight and mate-
rial transport mode, in order to build the station, from DDU (car-
ried by boat until this station) to Concordia. Thus, the issue then
was a technical, material, technological, logistical and economical
challenge. The traverse has been explored more from a technical
point of view than a safety aspect, only guided by an experiential
or empirical observation. In Antarctica, the environment hostility
does not facilitate human activities, more particularly when those
take place outside such as mechanical task to repair machines.
During the traverse, temperatures can be below 50 °C in Febru-
ary. Thus, in this context, the smallest incident, if not managed
immediately, can bear heavy consequences and become dramatic
due to a limited medical assistance and the isolation. The vital
prognostic is quickly engaged.
The polar traverse could be defined as a set of vehicles in move-
ment in the polar continent, with a total autonomy. Eleven days are
necessary to reach Concordia from DDU. Three return-trips DDU–
Concordia are organized during the austral summer (between
November and February). The convoy is composed with about
ten persons, with a minimum of seven mechanics and one doctor,
three (snow trains), seven machines, three levelling machines, and
loads are consisting of fuel tanks and containers (see Diagram 1).
The logistical traverse has to carry freight to Concordia with both
quantitative and qualitative criteria, as quickly as possible and con-
suming as little fuel as possible. Today, twenty-two years after the
first traverse, no human loss has been reported since the traverse
was set up.
During about twenty-three days for a return trip, traversers will
cross the white-ice desert living in a caravan and driving eleven
hours per day. The traverse will be punctuated with mechanical
incidents considered as unexpected events. All raiders know that
incidents will happen during the traverse. Thus, in that way, we
can consider that such situations are not unforeseen. It is however
impossible to determine which kind of incident, when (in bad
weather conditions), neither how and which consequence such sit-
uations will entail (pieces to repair or not? Know-how or experi-
ence to face the event?) nor where exactly in the convoy, which
material, etc. In this regard, such events can be considered as
unforeseen... Everybody knows that this will have incidents, but
nobody knows exactly which ones. The real risk rests more in
the incident conditions per se than concerning the unforeseen
event in its current form.
Thus, in this context, the goal of the research deals with the sys-
tem capabilities to withstand shocks or unexpected events, and to
face harsh conditions every year, in order to answer the question
regarding strategies of organizational resilience used to ensure
the safety in a productive system. In the case of the traverse, ‘‘un-
foreseen” can be considered as a risky situation, jeopardizing the
traverse group during a limited period of time, thus calling on
the resilience abilities of this system. What is the nature of the
unforeseen situations on the traverse? What solutions can be
found? What strategies of organizational resilience can be
deployed? To investigate these questions, we rely on the operative
logic to manage risks during the traverses when unexpected events
occurred. An explanatory study was conducted over three com-
plete traverses (return trips) from which we gathered in situ data
in real and dynamic situation to understand how the unforeseen
events were managed, ensuring the organizational resilience of
the system. Firstly, an analysis of the unforeseen events will be
presented, as well as the solutions offered. Secondly, a single tra-
verse will be used to present a case study to understand the role
of the operators and the organization to act in the management
of unexpected events and strategies deployed.
2. Method
2.1. Tools and procedure
The methodology used was, firstly, aimed at describing and
characterizing the unforeseen events on the polar traverse and,
secondly, at conducting ergonomic analysis of operators’ activities
when the unforeseen situation occurred in particular. The method-
ology chosen was to analyze immediately operators’ activity in
unforeseen and natural situation during the traverse and their
interventions by means of observations in so far as, in such situa-
tions, the event is not necessarily known and neither are the tech-
nicians who are likely to intervene. As mentioned by De La Garza
(2000), troubleshooting activities, by nature unannounced, make
it impossible to define accurate observation conditions. Conse-
quently, the ergonomic analysis of operators’ interventions only
concerned the three polar traverses studied. Nevertheless, particu-
lar attention was paid, whenever possible, to the potential transfer
of this methodology to other risky environments.
Using both à quantitative and a qualitative approach, data were
gathered over a 3-year period from 2012 to 2015. Participating eth-
nological observations were carried out from immersion work
(note taking, films, photos). On board the outward and return trips
of the convoys, the goal was to experience the traverse from the
inside, (a) to understand exactly what unforeseen event referred
to (the nature of unforeseen events), (b) to access proposed solu-
tions without hindering the work in progress and (c) to understand
the various actions undertaken during the traverse which could
impact the management of unforeseen events and strategies of
organizational resilience employed by operators. The methods
used were the following: (1) firstly, objective and quantitative data
relating to the unforeseen events encountered were identified, in
order to proceed to a categorization of events (Amalberti, 1996).
2 A. Villemain, P. Godon / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008
Considered as unforeseen events were those, which required a
complete and unforeseen halt of the convoy or a delayed departure
with regard to the starting point. It was studied as a stop sign of the
normal process (Hollnagel, 2010). To begin with, ground data were
collected when the unforeseen events occurred, such as the date
and the time of the unforeseen events, the length of time the con-
voy was stopped, the GPS location, the nature of the unforeseen
event, and the nature of the solutions put forward. The goal was
to understand the conditions of the occurrence of the unforeseen
events as well as the intervention logic of the traverse members
in the management of the unforeseen events, but also to compared
by experience the difference between ‘‘normal situations” and ‘‘un-
foreseen situations”; (2) secondly, equipped observations (by
notes, audio–visual recordings) of the raiders’ activities when an
unforeseen events occurred to keep an update of the strategies
deployed by the system and operators to deal with the distur-
bances; Monitoring these operators’ activities would allow imme-
diate interventions to be observed in real world setting; and (3)
thirdly, interviews were collected in situ, each day throughout
the traverses, with the leader of the convoy involved. Thus, the
chronological order of events on the day (hour by hour) was
respected during interviews in order to trigger the memory. The
aim was to try to understand each action carried out and the
strategic operational actions to respond to unexpected incidents.
2.2. Analysis
In a first time, all data from each traverse were transcribed and
compiled so as to give meaning to the management of the unfore-
seen events in the form of matrices to document each unforeseen
event produced and each action carried out during the traverse.
In a second time, analyses of interventions on the three traverses
were led from a temporal reconstruction of the raiders’ course on
the basis of all the data. This reconstruction combined a temporal
structure (history of the intervention on the unforeseen event) and
a functional structure (real work activities of the operators). Vari-
ous elements contributing to this history were then investigated
(in verbalizations and equipped observations) in order to better
understand the global organizational logic. In a third time, verba-
tim and all usable data were categorized using a thematic analysis
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008) with frequencies of categories for each
unforeseen situation. Moreover, the position of the unforeseen
events was converted and then transcribed onto a traverse route
map (Diagram 1). The traces collected during the traverse were
documented (Tables 1 and 2) highlighting the day, the observa-
tions, the interventions, and the length of the intervention.
2.3. Reliability
In this study, the data was validated in four steps: (1) the notes
taken during the three traverses were transcribed, sorted and orga-
nized according to three ideas: all the actions carried out during
the traverse commanded by the convoy leader, the unforeseen
events per se, and the solutions applied. We therefore retained
all the information consistent with these 3 preoccupations. Two
investigators analyzed material following the procedures recom-
mended by Miles and Huberman (1994). Each investigator read
the transcripts and individually encoded them following this pro-
cedure; the reliability between judges was verified and the agree-
ment rate was 100%; (2) the notes from the informal interviews
(for the traverse 50, the case study) were transcribed, presented
and discussed with the convoy leader of the traverse when there
was disagreement until it was clarified; (3) the final results
obtained, for the three traverses and including the traverse 50
and notably concerning the nature of the unforeseen events as well
as the actions implemented, were presented to the designer of the
traverse who validated them, according to his great experience;
and (4) thematic units concerning operators’ interventions to cope
unforeseen events were categorized. The agreement rate was 95%
and discrepancies were discussed until agreed upon.
3. Results
The results are presented in 2 parts. In the first part, objective
and quantified dimension with figures and regrouping the data
from all three traverses are presented in order to understand the
organizational resilience with a global perspective. They aim to
show all the interventions carried out on the traverse, consecutive
or not to breakdowns. The objective of this approach is to under-
stand the nature (a) of the unforeseen events; (b) the interventions
proposed; (c) the actions carried out during the traverses linked to
the management of the unforeseen events. In the second part, a
single traverse will be presented as a case study in order to attempt
to extract a strategic operational understanding from it with a
specific point of view born of action and activity. For this, an expla-
nation of the composition of the convoy during traverse 50 is
described, as well as cartography of the unforeseen events. Each
unforeseen incident, the intervention proposed as well as the
Diagram 1. Composition of convoy at the start of the traverse.
A. Villemain, P. Godon / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
3
Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008
Table 1
Types of incidents, interventions and length of interventions of the traverse 50.
Days Observations Interventions Length
Traverse outward journey
1 Speed of ST1 too slow Attachment of grading machine 8 to aid with traction 10 min
2 Hose (2) Repair 1 h 15 min
Alternator (2) Repair 20 min
3T°C high exhaust level (10) Modification of convoy 20 min
Broken tank hook Abandon modification of convoy 10 min
Hydraulic motor (K1) Repair 2 h 15 min
Command ventilator (K4) Repair 1 h
6 Off-track, tank stuck in snow Fuel transfer convoy modification 3 h
7 Broken tank hook Dumping tank convoy modification 20 min
8 Injectors (2) Irreparable machine loaded onto 2 h
Sledge convoy modification
9 Control blade (K4) Repair 1 h
Alternator belt (K1) Repair 30 min
10 Starter (10) Repair 6 h
Torn sheet metal container Convoy modification 30 min
2 off-track incidents Intervention (X2) 2 h
Total: 20 h 40 min
Traverse return
1 Valve blade (K2) Repair 40 min
2 Headlights (K3) Repair 20 min
Broken caravan hook Repair 1 h
Leak in power generator Repair 10 min
Infiltration of exhaust fumes in cabin (6) Repair 20 min
4 Headlights (11) Convoy modification 20 min
Hydraulic motor ventilation (K2) Irreparable machine loaded onto sledge convoy modification 2 h
5 Leak of radiator cooling liquid (9) Repair 20 min
Starting (9) Repair 10 min
6 Wheel unscrewed when Caterpillar leaving (9) Irreparable machine loaded onto sledge convoy modification 1 h
Lack of power ST1 Convoy modification 20 min
7 Door handle broken (10) Repair 30 min
Drawbar broken Repair + convoy modification 2 h
8 Flexible + command blade (K1) Repair (2) + convoy modification 1 h
Lack of power (10) Convoy modification 20 min
Pistons (K1) Repair + convoy modification 20 min
Total: 10 h 50 min
Table 2
The convoy re-organization to repair and anticipate the future.
Observations ST1 Interventions
Speed too slow Hitching of grading machine 8 to tow (day)
Hose (2) Mechanical intervention
Alternator (2) Mechanical intervention
Off-track, tank stuck in snow Organizational intervention
Broken tank hook ? reparable but not carried out 1. Abandon tank
2. Recuperation of a tank from ST2 ? relief
3. Machine mounted on transport ski in ST2
4. Modification of convoy (8 tractor on ST1)
5. Recuperation of a tank from ST2
Injectors (2) Irreparable
Observations ST2 Interventions
T°C high exhaust level (10) 1. ST2 tank in ST1 following broken hook
2. Pumping of ST2 tank
3. Tank in RT1 following machine on ski
Tank hook broken (end of day) ? reparable but not carried out 1. Pumping tank ST2
2. Abandon tank ST2
Command ventilator (K4) Mechanical intervention
Command blade (K4) Mechanical intervention
Starter (10) 1. Mechanical intervention (6h)
2. Pumping tank ST2
3. Abandon tank ST2
2 off-track incidents Organizational intervention
Observations ST3 Interventions
Hydraulic motor (K1) Hydraulic motor (K1)
Sheet metal container torn => irreparable 1. Modification of convoy in 4 trailers with the container hitched to 8 (ST4)
2. Modification of position of machines between STl and ST3
3. Modification of position of grading machines: all in front of ST1
Alternator belt (K1) Mechanical intervention
Observations ST4 Interventions
Off-track incident Organizational intervention
4 A. Villemain, P. Godon / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008
length of the latter, will be analyzed in order to better understand
the strategies of organizational resilience developed.
3.1. Objective and quantified dimension to understand the resilience
On the three traverses carried out, we identified 95 unforeseen
events, that is to say 95 regulatory actions following the occur-
rence of a hazard.
3.1.1. Five kinds of unforeseen events
The results indicate the existence of five types of unforeseen
events provoking a temporary stop of the convoy or its delayed
departure (Fig. 1):
Stalling of the tractors (15%) arising either from increased trac-
tive effort following the sinking in snow of the loads or because
the loads stayed stuck to the ground at morning startup, or from
a lack of grip of the tractor itself because of the surface being too
icy.
Breakdowns (58%), which concern mainly the machines, the
generator set.
Breakages (16%), which concern the hitches for items being
towed.
Bad weather (8%), which only allows reduced visibility in the
best of cases and a circulation with special headlights to
increase the contrast.
Off-track incidents (3%), linked to inattention or to falling asleep
at the wheel, following which the loads sink into the loose snow
because the skis left the compacted track.
3.1.2. Mechanical, organizational solutions, or both
The results indicate that these unforeseen events can be regu-
lated in three ways (Fig. 2): by means of a mechanical intervention
(53%), by an intervention on the organization of the convoy (orga-
nizational) (40%), by a mechanical and an organizational or com-
bined intervention (7%). Although mechanical interventions are
in the majority, actions on the organization of the convoy are an
undeniable lever in the management of the unforeseen events. Sev-
eral interventions combine both to ensure the repair and also pre-
vention to relieve trailer hitches. An action on the organization of
the convoy is most of the time to act as a support for the repair,
for the mechanical intervention performed. Modifications to the
convoy can also be carried out instead of a repair, if the targeted
part is irreparable and does not exist in the stock of spare parts.
When we look at the nature of the interventions according to
the type of unforeseen events, it can be observed that the break-
downs and breakages are managed by three types of intervention
(Fig. 3). Organizational interventions are carried out whatever
the type of unforeseen event.
3.1.3. Other organizational actions carried out on the traverses to
anticipate incidents
In total, we identified 143 actions performed during the three
traverses for 95 unforeseen events. These results suggest that other
actions were performed independently, or at least indirectly, to the
occurrence of the unforeseen events. The actions identified corre-
spond to the organizational interventions: if 44% of the actions
were performed following the unforeseen events, 56% of these
actions were not consecutive to the occurrence of the events
(Fig. 4). It is very likely that these peripheral actions play a funda-
mental role in the management of unforeseen events.
3.1.4. The organizational game
The organizational modifications during the traverse and non-
consecutive to the occurrence of an unforeseen event meet two
objectives with regard to the lever of action chosen: first, an objec-
tive of breakdown prevention by acting on the position of the
machines in the convoy (Fig. 5). It is possible to « play » with the
58%
16%
15%
3%
8%
Breakdowns
Breakages
Trenching
Off-track
Bad weather
Fig. 1. Nature of unforeseen events on the traverses.
53%
40%
7%
Mechanical
intervenons
Organizaonal
intervenons
Combined
intervenons
Fig. 2. Nature of interventions following the appearance of unforeseen events.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Mechanical
intervenons
Organizaonal
intervenons
Combined
intervenons
Fig. 3. Nature of intervention for each type of unforeseen event on all 3 traverses.
44%
56%
Organizaonal
intervenons
following
unforeseen
events
Other
organizaonal
intervenons
Fig. 4. Distribution of organizational interventions on the traverses.
30%
55%
11%
4%
Organizaon of
the machines
Organizaon of
tanks
Organizaon of
work
Organizaon of
road trucks
Fig. 5. Possible variations in the organization.
A. Villemain, P. Godon / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
5
Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008
location of the machines inside a train depending on the patholo-
gies they present (30%, breakdown prevention according to the
tractor symptoms). Next, an objective to improve production and
output will lead to modifications in the positions of fuel tanks
(55%, the best compromise between fuel consumption and the
homogenization of the speed of movement of the trains in the con-
voy). To do this, a game of musical chairs will take place. In fact, the
convoy leader calculates and decides which fuel tanks will be left
on the road with the fuel of the return trip. In parallel he must also
choose which tank will be pumped at the end of the day to to fill
the reservoirs of the machines.
The work can also be organized otherwise depending notably
on climatic conditions: filling the reservoirs tanks can be shifted
to the morning of the next day to shorten the exposure to the
low temperatures of the operators in charge of this task (it is colder
at night than during the day). If the weather conditions are too
deteriorated (white out), the driving time can be adapted: when
it is darker, the landscape shows better with the headlights than
during peak daytime hours (11%). Finally, actions on the disposi-
tion of the loads inside a train or on the position of the tractors
can be implemented (4%). For example, if the conditions reduce
visibility too much and it becomes necessary to move with head-
lights, the equipped tractors could change place in a train or in
the convoy because not all the tractors are equipped. Finally, as
some loads can also be associated with certain tractors, it will be
necessary to reshuffle the sledge order of a train and sometimes
the whole convoy.
3.2. Case study: the example of traverse 50
3.2.1. The convoy composition logic to anticipate incidents
The liaison by surface convoy must satisfy both technical and
economic constraints. The freight must be delivered in good condi-
tion, on schedule and with a transport cost as low as possible. The
final goal being to reduce the unitary tractive effort. Traverse 50
was a convoy composed of 3 snow trains that we will name ST1,
ST2, and ST3. Snow train 1 carried the caravans dedicated to per-
sonnel, the one which produced electric energy (heating), the one
with the dormitory, the refectory and the kitchen (life), the one
with the food supplies and the one with the spare parts. The first
train therefore determines the speed of the convoy. Between
brackets is shown the number of involved machines. Seven Cater-
pillar tractor type machines to tow the loads (machines 2, 10, 11, 6,
9, 5, 3), 3 levelling machines to facilitate the passage of the convoy
(K1, K2, K3). The fuel tanks with the fuel for the return will be left
along the route on the outward journey to lighten the convoy
(Diagram 1).
3.2.2. Repair at any cost ...
The traverse took 19 days to make the 2300 km return trip.
From observations and traces taken during the traverse, 32 inci-
dents were identified (Fig. 6): 18 on the outward journey, 14 on
the return (Table 1). The results show a total of 31.30 h of interven-
tions out of 209 h of movement of the convoy.
Fig. 6. Mapping of incidents during the traverse 50.
6 A. Villemain, P. Godon / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008
The results which follow were supported by the content of
interviews carried out with the convoy leader in situ according
to the time of the unforeseen events. The results of Table 1 show
that the length of the mechanical intervention is not a criteria in
the decision to repair or not. Only the availability of spare parts
on board the traverse shop is decisive. As a result, we can observe
a repair of 6 h (example of the starter, in bold in the Table 1), with
cutting the bodywork using a grinder etc. The operators are there-
fore exposed to cold temperatures during this time. The impor-
tance seems to be to preserve the machine as long as possible
despite the hostility of the environment and the hard conditions
of the repair.
3.2.3. Modifications of the convoy during the traverse
The outward journey of the traverses has many more con-
straints than the return journey: there is a strong ascending eleva-
tion, the convoy is loaded to the maximum at departure, no load
can be abandoned since the objective is to supply Concordia. There
is also the question of dumping the tanks on the track to store fuel
for the return trip. However there is the same number of incidents
than during the return.
We have therefore only studied all the variations of the convoy
in detail on the outward journey of the traverse (Table 2). The
results of this case study highlight several things. First, with regard
to mechanical interventions following breakdowns or breakages,
two types of situation are possible: either it is reparable or it is
not. On this outward trip, in 4 out of 11 situations of breakdown
or breakage, repair was not possible. As a consequence, the results
show an organizational intervention on several levels, having
repercussions on other snow trains, each time on at least 2 snow
trains (ST), with 2–3 parallel actions, and this, uniquely in the case
of non-reparation. Thus organizational intervention is carried out
on the whole of the convoy depending on the information of the
moment. In certain cases (such as the breakages of the tank hooks),
the breakage was irreparable. But the arrival of this unforeseen
event at that particular moment (aided by the proximity of arrival
in Concordia for example) was a decisive factor in the dumping of
the tank to waste as little time as possible and to deliver the goods
to the station as early as possible. Thus the option chosen can
sometimes be to postpone the repair until the return trip, even
to the return to base.
4. Discussion
4.1. Synthesis
Resilience focused not only on creating resilient system but also
maintaining and managing system resilience. Framework contri-
butions proposed by Rankin et al. (2014) is intended to support
both perspective and prospective safety management activities.
Prospective analysis is supported by the analysis of adaptation
enablers, objectives and situational conditions and supports mak-
ing prediction on how changes may affect the system. How practi-
tioners and their management recognize, communicate and
perceive work practice is critical for managing and maintaining
system resilience (informal exchange between raiders during the
fuel problem). The system should support and enable people to
be adaptative to increase the system resilience potential thanks
to a systematic analysis of strategies.
The results highlighted strategies of organizational resilience to
cope unforeseen events which resided in reactive and proactive
action alternation during the traverse, acting on (1) the dynamic
convoy organization : the logic convoy composition to distribute
loads (according to engines and their power and symptoms) and
the organizational game with sledges and machines during the
traverse before the unforeseen event; and (2) the competences
and the risk evaluation: a specific work organization to repair at
any coast in a hostile context, with mechanical and organizational
competences.
4.1.1. A dynamic organization of the convoy to manage safety
The results emphasize that almost half the interventions on the
traverse concern preventive actions or attempts to optimize out-
put, notably with regard to the ratio between the consumption of
fuel and the speed of the convoy. Even if the maintenance opera-
tions carried out each evening were preventive, this proactive per-
spective plays an essential role in the management of unforeseen
events on safety (in accordance with Safety Management System)
and on the appearance of future breakdowns.
4.1.1.1. Autonomy. Moreover, breakdowns or mechanical problems
on the traverse created opportunities to build the proactive safety,
thanks to precedent reactive mode and operators’ autonomy. These
opportunities from mechanical incidents allowed modifying the
convoy organization to ensure the future safety. This logic is the
same when traversers have to move tanks through the caravan’s
fuel station for example: it is a costly task in time, but also the
opportunity to bring a new organization of the convoy in order
to try to anticipate future incidents. The proactive management
is representative of the autonomy allowed by the organization on
the traverse, an observation made in previous studies (Villemain
and Godon, 2015). Thus, proactive management is only possible
on condition that the organization allows the operators enough
freedom to be autonomous and due to reactive work. It is thanks
to this autonomy that the system can be kept in perpetual move-
ment. The possibility of acting so much on the organization of
the snow trains, the position of the machines in the convoy, the
positioning of the tanks, the choice of fuel tanks to be emptied or
even the hours of work all represent the leader of the convoy’s
margin for maneuverability, allowed by the organization. More-
over, the objective is thus not so much to arrive in Concordia in
the best time possible but to keep the machines functioning to
the maximum, in short, to keep the margin of maneuver existing
for as long as possible, opening the field of possibilities in order
to have a supplementary option in the management of future
breakdowns. This can be equated with a strategy of management
of uncertainty and of the organizational resilience. This constitutes
the main guarantee of organizational reliability and of safety. It is a
question of permanent negotiation between advancing and pre-
serving the equipment, the redefined goal finally being to advance
with a convoy, which has the most possible functional resources to
ensure future safety.
4.1.1.2. Perpetual modifications. In the field of resilience, perfor-
mance variability is seen as essential to ensure an organizational
resilience (Hollnagel et al., 2010). Dynamics is maintained by the
perpetual modifications of the convoy, thus enabling the preserva-
tion of flexibility to half a day, thanks to operators’ autonomy and
mechanical/organizational competences. Proactive management
therefore exists in the multiple efforts and attempts at changes
to allow the system to keep in perpetual movement and not to
become frozen. As if risk emanated more easily from a static posi-
tion, equated with a non-control of the situation, with a risk suf-
fered, with a rupture of rhythm. Furthermore, the results reveal a
complexity in organizational activity: the organizational modifica-
tions are not limited only to a specific modification to the snow
trains on which the unforeseen event occurs, but affect all the
trains and therefore the convoy, with consequences in the form
of ramifications, affecting several elements of action. Resilience is
not immediate. It is not an organizational reflex but there is a tem-
poral density necessary to its building.
A. Villemain, P. Godon / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
7
Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008
4.1.2. Competences and risk evaluation
4.1.2.1. Specific work organization. Even when exposed to low tem-
peratures, the objective is to repair the machine to preserve it for
as long as possible despite the hostility of the environment and
the extreme conditions of repair. This strategy seems to be a deci-
sive factor in the construction of safety in this type of environ-
ment: future safety is ensured by being in danger temporarily. As
much as possible, and whatever the length of time taken for the
repair of the breakdown, the priority is to repair the machine; even
if it breaks down repeatedly, the purpose is to keep it functional for
as long as possible. These results demand attention, as it has been
shown previously that the work on the traverse is mainly orga-
nized around reducing the time exposed to cold temperatures, a
risk factor (Villemain and Godon, 2015).
4.1.2.2. Combined competences. And it is without doubt here that
the skills of the operators specific to the polar environment come
into play: beyond the mechanical know-how of the raiders, their
understanding and knowledge of the polar environment and the
constraints (especially for the convoy leader who is the decision
maker on the traverse) enable modifications and transformations
to be made to the convoy a priori of unforeseen events. Resilience
lies in the end on the skills of the operators, the strategies and
compromises developed on a daily basis so that the system works
(Woods and Cook, 2002), even if mechanical skill is followed very
closely by the development of organizational skills as well as a
general understanding of the environment and of its constraints,
adaptation skills. In addition, the results of the current study
seemed to indicate the existence of an alternation between reac-
tive and proactive modes in the traverse organization.
4.1.2.3. Risk evaluation and the risk acceptability. The expression
safety-performance is perhaps only possible in such conditions,
with a calculation of the acceptability of the risk taking. Previous
researches on polar environment in Antarctica showed the work
in extreme conditions (hostile) could develop new competences
and know-how for operators, considering thus the polar environ-
ment as an enabling environment (Villemain and Lémonie, 2014),
as the constructive ergonomics indicated it (Falzon, 2014). A recent
research on the polar traverse indicated that the specific organiza-
tion of the traverse was enabling, thus the traverse was an enabling
organization (Villemain and Godon, 2015). According to these con-
siderations, risky environments are favorable to the competences
development, but in a certain limit: Because of the habitude, peo-
ple minimized the risk evaluation, because of the acquisition of
these competences in the time. Thus, the risk acceptability and
the risk evaluation, depend on the operators’ competences. And
the danger appears when the operator used to be in hostile
environment.
4.1.2.4. Opportunistic bricolage or inventive solutions. Furthermore,
great lengths are taken to repair, with the implementation of dar-
ing intervention strategies. Cutting the bodywork of a tractor with
a power-cutting tool because the mechanics could not access the
starter is a good example of this: apart from war, these processes
would not be used on another continent. The organizational relia-
bility is based above all on having flexibility, notably in the cases of
critical situations, where « do-it-yourself » improvisation is recog-
nized as a source of resilience (Weick, 1993). While organizational
resilience, in this case, certainly consists in the ability of the orga-
nization to resist shocks, it also consists in avoiding them (Roux-
Dufort and Vidaillet, 2003). In the case of the traverse, safety does
not lie in « set » formalisms, but on strategies, on showing initia-
tive, on finding opportunistic solutions for breakdowns, bricolage,
an improvisation and resourcefulness shown by the operators in
real-life situations. It is thus built by human expertise and by
putting into action in real time both individual and collective skills.
All these things reinforce the dynamic vision of safety.
4.2. Limitations
These results have limitations that require further studying.
Firstly, they are derived from a study of only 3 traverses, due to
the difficulty to participate and to collect data on a large number
of traverses. The data collections are costly because they are led
in immersion. No studies have been done in this area. It is thus
an explanatory study which needs to investigate the better way
to understand the safety dimension as a whole. Finally, it would
have been better to complete our analysis by gathering the collec-
tive activity analysis of the work and not only the task; that is to
say focusing on the traversers behaviors (called ‘‘ the doing”) and
on verbal communication exchanged within the team (called ‘‘the
understanding”) (
Cuvelier and Falzon, 2015). This dimension did
not appear in this article. But a reflexive and methodological work
is necessary in order to grasp the system resilience through tra-
versers’ actions in a natural world setting, in a specific context such
as the polar environment.
4.3. Implications
From these results, some key-lessons could be proposed regard-
ing the traverse management. First, organizational actions will
allow to be in a complexity reading of the situation (convoy as a
whole) and not in an analytic reading in order to solve problems
one by one on an isolated basis. Secondly, the know-how devel-
oped during the traverse does not only reside on mechanical com-
petences but also organizational ones to negotiate the risk
acceptability with regards to repairing and to ensuring the future
safety. Thirdly, the organizational strategies development con-
tributes to a permanent movement and prevents a set and static
convoy composition. This movement also prevents being hindered
by uncertainty which is difficult and impossible to manage as a
whole.
The results of this study address high-risk environments, speci-
fic and confined, like in space; the analogy can particularly be
made with long-duration space flights, like to Mars, where there
will be a group of humans, left to their own resources, autonomous
and without possible assistance, who will have to learn to cope
with unforeseen events.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the notion of an
unforeseen event remains very vague and « is always relative to a
concrete subject and to cognitive processes situated in a context
of action, social relationships, a physical context and limited by
the knowledge and know-how of the operator » (Perrenoud,
1999, p. 123). The question regarding unforeseen for whom
remains to be seen. One has to take into account that the tra-
versers, regulars on the traverse now for a good twenty years,
are no longer surprised by anything. It is noted that working for
long periods in polar conditions has led to habituation (Villemain
and Godon, 2015). The situations met, even though remaining con-
sidered as undesirable events, are not really unforeseen. As a
result, the situations chosen represent mainly what Hollnagel
(2004) called possible situations, i.e., thought about unforeseen
events. It is normal that on the traverse there should be a type of
unforeseen events described throughout this article. Ultimately,
it is a normal abnormality! It therefore becomes interesting to note
what happens to the system as soon as this balance is broken by an
unusual unforeseen event and to understand how the management
of an unthought-of or unforeseen event is built (Hollnagel, 2004)
on the traverse, like in 2013, when the fuel started to freeze on
the return journey of the traverse.
8 A. Villemain, P. Godon / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008
References
Amalberti, R., 1996. La conduite des systèmes à risques. PUF, Coll. Le travail humain,
Paris
.
Cuvelier, C., Falzon, P., 2015. The collective construction of safety: a trade-off
between ‘‘understanding” and ‘‘doing” in managing dynamic situations. Appl.
Ergonomics 47, 117–126
.
Corbin, J.A., Strauss, A., 2008. Basics of Qualitative Research. Sage, Thousand Oaks,
CA
.
Daniellou, F., Simard, M., Boissières, I., 2009. Facteurs humains et organisationnels
de la sécurité industrielle: un état de l’art. FonCSI, Toulouse
.
Dekker, S., 2006. Resilience engineering: chronicling the emergence of confused
consensus. In: Hollnagel, E., Woods, D., Leveson, N. (Eds.), Resilience
Engineering: Concepts and Precepts. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK, pp. 77–92
.
Dekker, S., Dahlstrom, N., van Winsen, R., Nyce, J., 2008. Crew resilience and
simulator training in aviation. In: Hollnagel, E., Nemeth, C., Dekker, S. (Eds.),
Resilience Engineering Perspectives: Remaining Sensitive to the Possibility of
Failure, 1. Ashgate Studies in Resilience Engineering, Aldershot, UK, pp. 119–
126
.
De La Garza, C., 2000. L’activité de diagnostic dans un système dynamique: le cas du
dépannage d’installations de signalisation ferroviaire. Rev. Eur. Psychol. Appl.
50 (1), 39–49
.
Falzon, P., 2014. Constructive Ergonomics. Taylor & Francis, CRC Press.
Hale, A.R., Heijer, T., 2006. Defining resilience. In: Hollnagel, E., Woods, D.D.,
Leveson, N. (Eds.), Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts. Ashgate,
Aldershot, UK, pp. 35–40
.
Hale, A.R., Hovden, J., 1998. Management and culture: the third age of safety. A
review of approaches to organizational aspects of safety, health and
environment. In: Feyer, A.M., Williamson, A. (Eds.), Occupational Injury. Risk
Prevention and Intervention. Taylor & Francis, London
.
Hollnagel, E., 2004. Barriers and Accident Prevention. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK.
Hollnagel, E., 2006. Resilience: the challenge of the unstable. In: Hollnagel, E.,
Woods, D.D., Leveson, N. (Eds.), Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts.
Ashgate, Aldershot, UK, pp. 9–19
.
Hollnagel, E., 2008. Risk + barriers = safety? Saf. Sci. 46 (2), 221–229.
Hollnagel, E., 2009. The four cornerstones of resilience engineering. In: Nemeth, C.,
Hollnagel, E., Dekker, S. (Eds.), Resilience Engineering Perspectives, Vol 2.
Preparation and Restoration. Ashgate, Farnham, UK, pp. 117–133
.
Hollnagel, E., 2010. Prologue: the scope of resilience engineering. In: Hollnagel, E.,
Pariès, J., Woods, D., Wreathall, J. (Eds.), Resilience Engineering in Practice: A
Guidebook. Ashgate: Studies in Resilience Engineering
.
Hollnagel, E., 2012. FRAM. The Functional Resonance Analysis Method for Modelling
Complex Socio-technicals Systems. Ashgate, Farnham, UK
.
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D., 2006. Epilogue: resilience engineering precept. In:
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D., Leveson, N. (Eds.), Resilience Engineering: Concepts
and Precepts. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK, pp. 347–358
.
Hollnagel, E., Pariès, J., Woods, D., Wreathall, J., 2010. Resilience Engineering in
Practice: A Guidebook. Ashgate Studies in Resilience Engineering
.
Leveson, N., Dulac, N., Zipkin, D., Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J., Carroll, J., Barrett, B., 2006.
Engineering resilience into safety critical systems. In: Hollnagel, E., Woods, D.,
Leveson, N. (Eds.), Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts. Ashgate,
Aldershot, UK, pp. 95–123
.
Lièvre, P., 2007. La logistique. Editions La découverte. Collection Repères, Paris.
Lundberg, J., Johansson, B., 2006. Resilience, stability and requisite interpretation in
accident investigations. In: Hollnagel, E., Rigaud, E. (Eds.), 2nd International
Symposium on Resilience Engineering, 8–10 November, Juan-les-Pins, France,
pp. 191–198.
Lundberg, J., Johansson, B., 2007. Pragmatic resilience. In: Woltjer, R., Lundberg, J.,
Johansson, B., (Eds.), Proceedings of the Resilience Engineering Workshop, 25–
27 June, Vadstena, Sweden. <https://www.ep.liu.se/ecp/023/, > (Last visited
March 17, 2008).
Miles, M., Huberman, A.M., 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded
Sourcebook. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA
.
Morel, G., Amalberti, R., Chauvin, C., 2008. Articulating the differences between
safety and resilience: the decision-making process of professional sea-fishing
skippers. Hum. Factors 50 (1), 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1518/
001872008X250683.
Perrenoud, P., 1999. Gestion de l’imprévu, analyse de l’action et construction de
compétences. Education Permanente 140 (3), 123–144
.
Pidgeon, N., O’Leary, M., 2000. Man-made disasters: why technology and
organizations (sometimes) fail. Saf. Sci. 34 (1), 15–30
.
Rankin, A., Lundberg, J., Woltjer, R., Rollenhagen, C., Hollnagel, E., 2014. Resilience in
everyday opérations: a framework for analyzing adaptations in high-risk work.
J. Cognitive Eng. Decision Making 8 (1), 78–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
1555343413498753.
Rix-Lièvre, G., Lièvre, P., 2010. An innovative observatory of polar expedition
projects: an investigation of organizing. Project Manage. J. 41 (3), 91–98
.
Roux-Dufort, C., Vidaillet, B., 2003. The difficulties of improvising in a crisis
situation a case study. Int. Stud. Manage. Organization 33 (1), 86–115
.
Villemain, A., Godon, P., 2015. Construction de la fiabilité organisationnelle en
environnement extrême à partir de la sécurité réglée et gérée: étude de cas du
raid Concordia. (Organization reliability building in extreme environment from
the regulated and managed safety: the Concordia traverse case study).
Perspectives Interdisciplinaires sur le Travail et la Santé, 1–17
.
Villemain, A., Lémonie, Y., 2014. Environnement capacitant et engagement des
opérateurs: une mise en débat à partir de l’activité des techniciens de la base
polaire Dumont D’Urville. (Enabling environment and operators engagement: A
debate from the activity of technicians of the polar station Dumont D’Urville).
Activités 11, 26–43
.
Weick, K., 1993. The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: the Mann Gulch
disaster. Adm. Sci. Q. 38 (4), 628–652
.
Westrum, R., 2006. A typology of resilience situations. In: Hollnagel, E., Woods, D.,
Leveson, N. (Eds.), Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts. Ashgate,
Aldershot, UK, pp. 55–65
.
Woods, D., 2006. Essential characteristics of resilience. In: Hollnagel, E., Woods, D.
D., Leveson, N. (Eds.), Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts. Ashgate,
Aldershot, UK, pp. 21–33
.
Woods, D., 2009. Escaping failures of foresight. Saf. Sci. 47 (4), 498–501.
Woods, D., Cook, R., 2002. Nine steps to move forward from error. Cogn. Technol.
Work 4 (2), 137–144
.
Woods, D., Hollnagel, E., 2006. Prologue: resilience engineering concepts. In:
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D., Leveson, N. (Eds.), Resilience Engineering: Concepts
and Precepts. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK, pp. 1–6
.
A. Villemain, P. Godon / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
9
Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008