Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard

on the polar traverse

Aude Villemain

⇑

, Patrice Godon

University of Reims, Research Center on Work and Development (CRTD), Laboratory of Ergonomics, CNAM, Paris, France

Paul Emile Victor Institute (IPEV), France

article info

Article history:

Received 21 October 2015

Received in revised form 31 January 2016

Accepted 8 March 2016

Available online xxxx

Keywords:

Organizational resilience

Safety management

Polar conditions

Unexpected events

Proactive–reactive adjustments

abstract

The aim of this research is to understand the organizational resilience through the safety management

when unexpected events occurred, on an atypical transport environment, the polar traverse. Three polar

traverses were studied, one of which being a detailed case study. Thus, ethnological observations over

3 year periods from 2012 to 2015 (to understand the traverse logic, functioning through unexpected

event) and all-day interviews during a traverse (to understand actions and strategies of organizational

resilience to cope unforeseen events) were collected. The main results, from quantitative and qualitative

analysis, indicated (1) mechanical, organizational and both interventions allowed to face unexpected

incidents on the traverse, (2) great possibilities to take actions on the convoy organization enabled to

develop a pro-active management of the safety in alternation with reactive adjustments; (3) the impor-

tance was to preserve the machines functionality even if operators have to face environment hostility to

repair; and (4) the variation of the convoy organization was permanent in its whole even if the incidents

concerned only one road track. The strategies of organizational resilience building will be discussed in

this article, around the proactive–reactive management, the organizational dynamic, the risk evaluation,

and the risk taken to preserve the room manoeuver.

1. Introduction

The term « resilience » can sometimes, in certain cases, be

reserved for the management of unexpected disturbances « which

exceed the anticipated areas of adaptation » (Lundberg and

Johansson, 2006, 2007; Woods, 2006, 2009). A system is resilient

if workers adapt themselves by understanding the context in

which adaptation takes place. Adjustments are thus constantly

made by individuals and organization, even if they are more often

approximate rather than exact (Hollnagel, 2012). Every organiza-

tion is stretched to operate at its full capacity and, to be resilient,

a system needs to be able to anticipate whatever may happen,

monitor what is going on, respond effectively when something

happens, and learn from past experiences (Hollnagel, 2009;

Woods and Cook, 2002; Woods and Hollnagel, 2006). Conse-

quently, the organizational resilience strategies are questioned to

understand how a system could adjust itself to disturbances or

unexpected hazard.

One of the main objective of researches focused on the strate-

gies of organizational resilience is to understand the organizational

preconditions conducive to a safe performance (Pidgeon and

O’Leary, 2000). Some studies emphasized the need for proactive

measures in safety management, while proactive manner invested

in safety and resource allocations to safety improvement are key

factors in ensuring a resilient organization (Dekker et al., 2008).

Reactive adjustments are, by far, the most common ones. Short

terms responses are not enough to guarantee a system’s safety

and survivability. One reason for this is that the system can only

be prepared to respond to a limited set of events or conditions

and over a limited period of time. The reactive approach quickly

appears too restrictive (Daniellou et al., 2009; Hale and Heijer,

2006), as this new way of conceiving safety is of little interest if

it only reacts to events and does not anticipate them (Dekker,

2006; Hollnagel and Woods, 2006; Westrum, 2006). Consequently,

the proactive vision of resilience is therefore essential when aimed

at the prevention and adaptation of a system to changing condi-

tions prior to the occurrence of undesirable events (Hollnagel,

2006, 2008, 2009; Leveson et al., 2006; Morel et al., 2008;

Westrum, 2006; Woods and Hollnagel, 2006). Proactive adjust-

ments, however, mean that the system can change from a state

of normal operation to a state of readiness before something

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008

⇑

Corresponding author at: University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, UFR STAPS,

Campus Moulin de la Housse, Bât. 25, Chemin des Rouliers, BP 1036 - 51 687 REIMS

Cedex 2, France.

E-mail address: aude.villemain@univ-reims.fr (A. Villemain).

Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Safety Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.

Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008

happens. In this case, resources are allocated to match the require-

ments of the expected event and special functions may be acti-

vated. The Safety Management System (SMS) is interested in this

problematic, considering the fact that organizational and manage-

ment factors have to be taken into account to understand human

contribution to major accidents (Hale and Hovden, 1998). SMS is

the most efﬁcient way of allocative resources for safety regarding

which organization plays a major role. Supplementary resources

are mobilized and local strategies are deployed to cope with distur-

bances. This is « opportunistic bricolage » which is a way to offset

the disturbances and maintain the functioning of the system at

the lowest possible level of risk. It is a safety measure deployed

by human expertise, as well as the use of speciﬁc individual and

collective skills in real time, as previous studies in polar context

have already shown (Villemain and Lémonie, 2014; Villemain

and Godon, 2015).

Studies focused on extreme situation at work are poor in the

ergonomics approach, and even more so in polar context. Few

researches in polar conditions have been led in a logistics thematic

in arctic (Lièvre, 2007). At the present time, only our researches on

working conditions in the Antarctic context working are being car-

ried out with an ergonomics approach (Villemain and Lémonie,

2014; Villemain and Godon, 2015). To conduct research in such

conditions requires a speciﬁc methodology to collect data because

of the harsh conditions. Subsequently, the ethnographical method

is the most appropriate to the ground constraints (Rix-Lièvre and

Lièvre, 2010). These authors used this kind of method in order to

study ski polar expeditions in arctic through ethnological observa-

tions and interviews.

The context and motivations of this research are particular and

require to be speciﬁed. The French polar traverse, initiated in 1993,

was followed by the creation of the scientiﬁc French–Italian station

on the Antarctic continent called Concordia (situated to 1150 km

from the French station Dumont D’Urville (DDU) and opened in

2005). At that time, the objective was to design a freight and mate-

rial transport mode, in order to build the station, from DDU (car-

ried by boat until this station) to Concordia. Thus, the issue then

was a technical, material, technological, logistical and economical

challenge. The traverse has been explored more from a technical

point of view than a safety aspect, only guided by an experiential

or empirical observation. In Antarctica, the environment hostility

does not facilitate human activities, more particularly when those

take place outside such as mechanical task to repair machines.

During the traverse, temperatures can be below 50 °C in Febru-

ary. Thus, in this context, the smallest incident, if not managed

immediately, can bear heavy consequences and become dramatic

due to a limited medical assistance and the isolation. The vital

prognostic is quickly engaged.

The polar traverse could be deﬁned as a set of vehicles in move-

ment in the polar continent, with a total autonomy. Eleven days are

necessary to reach Concordia from DDU. Three return-trips DDU–

Concordia are organized during the austral summer (between

November and February). The convoy is composed with about

ten persons, with a minimum of seven mechanics and one doctor,

three (snow trains), seven machines, three levelling machines, and

loads are consisting of fuel tanks and containers (see Diagram 1).

The logistical traverse has to carry freight to Concordia with both

quantitative and qualitative criteria, as quickly as possible and con-

suming as little fuel as possible. Today, twenty-two years after the

ﬁrst traverse, no human loss has been reported since the traverse

was set up.

During about twenty-three days for a return trip, traversers will

cross the white-ice desert living in a caravan and driving eleven

hours per day. The traverse will be punctuated with mechanical

incidents considered as unexpected events. All raiders know that

incidents will happen during the traverse. Thus, in that way, we

can consider that such situations are not unforeseen. It is however

impossible to determine which kind of incident, when (in bad

weather conditions), neither how and which consequence such sit-

uations will entail (pieces to repair or not? Know-how or experi-

ence to face the event?) nor where exactly in the convoy, which

material, etc. In this regard, such events can be considered as

unforeseen... Everybody knows that this will have incidents, but

nobody knows exactly which ones. The real risk rests more in

the incident conditions per se than concerning the unforeseen

event in its current form.

Thus, in this context, the goal of the research deals with the sys-

tem capabilities to withstand shocks or unexpected events, and to

face harsh conditions every year, in order to answer the question

regarding strategies of organizational resilience used to ensure

the safety in a productive system. In the case of the traverse, ‘‘un-

foreseen” can be considered as a risky situation, jeopardizing the

traverse group during a limited period of time, thus calling on

the resilience abilities of this system. What is the nature of the

unforeseen situations on the traverse? What solutions can be

found? What strategies of organizational resilience can be

deployed? To investigate these questions, we rely on the operative

logic to manage risks during the traverses when unexpected events

occurred. An explanatory study was conducted over three com-

plete traverses (return trips) from which we gathered in situ data

in real and dynamic situation to understand how the unforeseen

events were managed, ensuring the organizational resilience of

the system. Firstly, an analysis of the unforeseen events will be

presented, as well as the solutions offered. Secondly, a single tra-

verse will be used to present a case study to understand the role

of the operators and the organization to act in the management

of unexpected events and strategies deployed.

2. Method

2.1. Tools and procedure

The methodology used was, ﬁrstly, aimed at describing and

characterizing the unforeseen events on the polar traverse and,

secondly, at conducting ergonomic analysis of operators’ activities

when the unforeseen situation occurred in particular. The method-

ology chosen was to analyze immediately operators’ activity in

unforeseen and natural situation during the traverse and their

interventions by means of observations in so far as, in such situa-

tions, the event is not necessarily known and neither are the tech-

nicians who are likely to intervene. As mentioned by De La Garza

(2000), troubleshooting activities, by nature unannounced, make

it impossible to deﬁne accurate observation conditions. Conse-

quently, the ergonomic analysis of operators’ interventions only

concerned the three polar traverses studied. Nevertheless, particu-

lar attention was paid, whenever possible, to the potential transfer

of this methodology to other risky environments.

Using both à quantitative and a qualitative approach, data were

gathered over a 3-year period from 2012 to 2015. Participating eth-

nological observations were carried out from immersion work

(note taking, ﬁlms, photos). On board the outward and return trips

of the convoys, the goal was to experience the traverse from the

inside, (a) to understand exactly what unforeseen event referred

to (the nature of unforeseen events), (b) to access proposed solu-

tions without hindering the work in progress and (c) to understand

the various actions undertaken during the traverse which could

impact the management of unforeseen events and strategies of

organizational resilience employed by operators. The methods

used were the following: (1) ﬁrstly, objective and quantitative data

relating to the unforeseen events encountered were identiﬁed, in

order to proceed to a categorization of events (Amalberti, 1996).

2 A. Villemain, P. Godon / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx

Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.

Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008

Considered as unforeseen events were those, which required a

complete and unforeseen halt of the convoy or a delayed departure

with regard to the starting point. It was studied as a stop sign of the

normal process (Hollnagel, 2010). To begin with, ground data were

collected when the unforeseen events occurred, such as the date

and the time of the unforeseen events, the length of time the con-

voy was stopped, the GPS location, the nature of the unforeseen

event, and the nature of the solutions put forward. The goal was

to understand the conditions of the occurrence of the unforeseen

events as well as the intervention logic of the traverse members

in the management of the unforeseen events, but also to compared

by experience the difference between ‘‘normal situations” and ‘‘un-

foreseen situations”; (2) secondly, equipped observations (by

notes, audio–visual recordings) of the raiders’ activities when an

unforeseen events occurred to keep an update of the strategies

deployed by the system and operators to deal with the distur-

bances; Monitoring these operators’ activities would allow imme-

diate interventions to be observed in real world setting; and (3)

thirdly, interviews were collected in situ, each day throughout

the traverses, with the leader of the convoy involved. Thus, the

chronological order of events on the day (hour by hour) was

respected during interviews in order to trigger the memory. The

aim was to try to understand each action carried out and the

strategic operational actions to respond to unexpected incidents.

2.2. Analysis

In a ﬁrst time, all data from each traverse were transcribed and

compiled so as to give meaning to the management of the unfore-

seen events in the form of matrices to document each unforeseen

event produced and each action carried out during the traverse.

In a second time, analyses of interventions on the three traverses

were led from a temporal reconstruction of the raiders’ course on

the basis of all the data. This reconstruction combined a temporal

structure (history of the intervention on the unforeseen event) and

a functional structure (real work activities of the operators). Vari-

ous elements contributing to this history were then investigated

(in verbalizations and equipped observations) in order to better

understand the global organizational logic. In a third time, verba-

tim and all usable data were categorized using a thematic analysis

(Corbin and Strauss, 2008) with frequencies of categories for each

unforeseen situation. Moreover, the position of the unforeseen

events was converted and then transcribed onto a traverse route

map (Diagram 1). The traces collected during the traverse were

documented (Tables 1 and 2) highlighting the day, the observa-

tions, the interventions, and the length of the intervention.

2.3. Reliability

In this study, the data was validated in four steps: (1) the notes

taken during the three traverses were transcribed, sorted and orga-

nized according to three ideas: all the actions carried out during

the traverse commanded by the convoy leader, the unforeseen

events per se, and the solutions applied. We therefore retained

all the information consistent with these 3 preoccupations. Two

investigators analyzed material following the procedures recom-

mended by Miles and Huberman (1994). Each investigator read

the transcripts and individually encoded them following this pro-

cedure; the reliability between judges was veriﬁed and the agree-

ment rate was 100%; (2) the notes from the informal interviews

(for the traverse 50, the case study) were transcribed, presented

and discussed with the convoy leader of the traverse when there

was disagreement until it was clariﬁed; (3) the ﬁnal results

obtained, for the three traverses and including the traverse 50

and notably concerning the nature of the unforeseen events as well

as the actions implemented, were presented to the designer of the

traverse who validated them, according to his great experience;

and (4) thematic units concerning operators’ interventions to cope

unforeseen events were categorized. The agreement rate was 95%

and discrepancies were discussed until agreed upon.

3. Results

The results are presented in 2 parts. In the ﬁrst part, objective

and quantiﬁed dimension with ﬁgures and regrouping the data

from all three traverses are presented in order to understand the

organizational resilience with a global perspective. They aim to

show all the interventions carried out on the traverse, consecutive

or not to breakdowns. The objective of this approach is to under-

stand the nature (a) of the unforeseen events; (b) the interventions

proposed; (c) the actions carried out during the traverses linked to

the management of the unforeseen events. In the second part, a

single traverse will be presented as a case study in order to attempt

to extract a strategic operational understanding from it with a

speciﬁc point of view born of action and activity. For this, an expla-

nation of the composition of the convoy during traverse 50 is

described, as well as cartography of the unforeseen events. Each

unforeseen incident, the intervention proposed as well as the

Diagram 1. Composition of convoy at the start of the traverse.

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Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.

Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008

Table 1

Types of incidents, interventions and length of interventions of the traverse 50.

Days Observations Interventions Length

Traverse outward journey

1 Speed of ST1 too slow Attachment of grading machine 8 to aid with traction 10 min

2 Hose (2) Repair 1 h 15 min

Alternator (2) Repair 20 min

3T°C high exhaust level (10) Modiﬁcation of convoy 20 min

Broken tank hook Abandon – modiﬁcation of convoy 10 min

Hydraulic motor (K1) Repair 2 h 15 min

Command ventilator (K4) Repair 1 h

6 Off-track, tank stuck in snow Fuel transfer – convoy modiﬁcation 3 h

7 Broken tank hook Dumping tank – convoy modiﬁcation 20 min

8 Injectors (2) Irreparable – machine loaded onto 2 h

Sledge – convoy modiﬁcation

9 Control blade (K4) Repair 1 h

Alternator belt (K1) Repair 30 min

10 Starter (10) Repair 6 h

Torn sheet metal container Convoy modiﬁcation 30 min

2 off-track incidents Intervention (X2) 2 h

Total: 20 h 40 min

Traverse return

1 Valve blade (K2) Repair 40 min

2 Headlights (K3) Repair 20 min

Broken caravan hook Repair 1 h

Leak in power generator Repair 10 min

Inﬁltration of exhaust fumes in cabin (6) Repair 20 min

4 Headlights (11) Convoy modiﬁcation 20 min

Hydraulic motor ventilation (K2) Irreparable – machine loaded onto sledge – convoy modiﬁcation 2 h

5 Leak of radiator cooling liquid (9) Repair 20 min

Starting (9) Repair 10 min

6 Wheel unscrewed when Caterpillar leaving (9) Irreparable – machine loaded onto sledge – convoy modiﬁcation 1 h

Lack of power ST1 Convoy modiﬁcation 20 min

7 Door handle broken (10) Repair 30 min

Drawbar broken Repair + convoy modiﬁcation 2 h

8 Flexible + command blade (K1) Repair (2) + convoy modiﬁcation 1 h

Lack of power (10) Convoy modiﬁcation 20 min

Pistons (K1) Repair + convoy modiﬁcation 20 min

Total: 10 h 50 min

Table 2

The convoy re-organization to repair and anticipate the future.

Observations ST1 Interventions

Speed too slow – Hitching of grading machine 8 to tow (day)

Hose (2) – Mechanical intervention

Alternator (2) – Mechanical intervention

Off-track, tank stuck in snow – Organizational intervention

Broken tank hook ? reparable but not carried out 1. Abandon tank

2. Recuperation of a tank from ST2 ? relief

3. Machine mounted on transport ski in ST2

4. Modiﬁcation of convoy (8 tractor on ST1)

5. Recuperation of a tank from ST2

Injectors (2) – Irreparable

Observations ST2 Interventions

T°C high exhaust level (10) 1. ST2 tank in ST1 following broken hook

2. Pumping of ST2 tank

3. Tank in RT1 following machine on ski

Tank hook broken (end of day) ? reparable but not carried out 1. Pumping tank ST2

2. Abandon tank ST2

Command ventilator (K4) – Mechanical intervention

Command blade (K4) – Mechanical intervention

Starter (10) 1. Mechanical intervention (6h)

2. Pumping tank ST2

3. Abandon tank ST2

2 off-track incidents – Organizational intervention

Observations ST3 Interventions

Hydraulic motor (K1) – Hydraulic motor (K1)

Sheet metal container torn => irreparable 1. Modiﬁcation of convoy in 4 trailers with the container hitched to 8 (ST4)

2. Modiﬁcation of position of machines between STl and ST3

3. Modiﬁcation of position of grading machines: all in front of ST1

Alternator belt (K1) – Mechanical intervention

Observations ST4 Interventions

Off-track incident – Organizational intervention

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Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.

Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008

length of the latter, will be analyzed in order to better understand

the strategies of organizational resilience developed.

3.1. Objective and quantiﬁed dimension to understand the resilience

On the three traverses carried out, we identiﬁed 95 unforeseen

events, that is to say 95 regulatory actions following the occur-

rence of a hazard.

3.1.1. Five kinds of unforeseen events

The results indicate the existence of ﬁve types of unforeseen

events provoking a temporary stop of the convoy or its delayed

departure (Fig. 1):

– Stalling of the tractors (15%) arising either from increased trac-

tive effort following the sinking in snow of the loads or because

the loads stayed stuck to the ground at morning startup, or from

a lack of grip of the tractor itself because of the surface being too

icy.

– Breakdowns (58%), which concern mainly the machines, the

generator set.

– Breakages (16%), which concern the hitches for items being

towed.

– Bad weather (8%), which only allows reduced visibility in the

best of cases and a circulation with special headlights to

increase the contrast.

– Off-track incidents (3%), linked to inattention or to falling asleep

at the wheel, following which the loads sink into the loose snow

because the skis left the compacted track.

3.1.2. Mechanical, organizational solutions, or both

The results indicate that these unforeseen events can be regu-

lated in three ways (Fig. 2): by means of a mechanical intervention

(53%), by an intervention on the organization of the convoy (orga-

nizational) (40%), by a mechanical and an organizational or com-

bined intervention (7%). Although mechanical interventions are

in the majority, actions on the organization of the convoy are an

undeniable lever in the management of the unforeseen events. Sev-

eral interventions combine both to ensure the repair and also pre-

vention to relieve trailer hitches. An action on the organization of

the convoy is most of the time to act as a support for the repair,

for the mechanical intervention performed. Modiﬁcations to the

convoy can also be carried out instead of a repair, if the targeted

part is irreparable and does not exist in the stock of spare parts.

When we look at the nature of the interventions according to

the type of unforeseen events, it can be observed that the break-

downs and breakages are managed by three types of intervention

(Fig. 3). Organizational interventions are carried out whatever

the type of unforeseen event.

3.1.3. Other organizational actions carried out on the traverses to

anticipate incidents

In total, we identiﬁed 143 actions performed during the three

traverses for 95 unforeseen events. These results suggest that other

actions were performed independently, or at least indirectly, to the

occurrence of the unforeseen events. The actions identiﬁed corre-

spond to the organizational interventions: if 44% of the actions

were performed following the unforeseen events, 56% of these

actions were not consecutive to the occurrence of the events

(Fig. 4). It is very likely that these peripheral actions play a funda-

mental role in the management of unforeseen events.

3.1.4. The organizational game

The organizational modiﬁcations during the traverse and non-

consecutive to the occurrence of an unforeseen event meet two

objectives with regard to the lever of action chosen: ﬁrst, an objec-

tive of breakdown prevention by acting on the position of the

machines in the convoy (Fig. 5). It is possible to « play » with the

58%

16%

15%

Breakdowns

Breakages

Trenching

Oﬀ-track

Bad weather

Fig. 1. Nature of unforeseen events on the traverses.

53%

40%

Mechanical

intervenons

Organizaonal

intervenons

Combined

intervenons

Fig. 2. Nature of interventions following the appearance of unforeseen events.

Mechanical

intervenons

Organizaonal

intervenons

Combined

intervenons

Fig. 3. Nature of intervention for each type of unforeseen event on all 3 traverses.

44%

56%

Organizaonal

intervenons

following

unforeseen

events

Other

organizaonal

intervenons

Fig. 4. Distribution of organizational interventions on the traverses.

30%

55%

11%

Organizaon of

the machines

Organizaon of

tanks

Organizaon of

work

Organizaon of

road trucks

Fig. 5. Possible variations in the organization.

A. Villemain, P. Godon / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx

Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.

Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008