
happens. In this case, resources are allocated to match the require-
ments of the expected event and special functions may be acti-
vated. The Safety Management System (SMS) is interested in this
problematic, considering the fact that organizational and manage-
ment factors have to be taken into account to understand human
contribution to major accidents (Hale and Hovden, 1998). SMS is
the most efficient way of allocative resources for safety regarding
which organization plays a major role. Supplementary resources
are mobilized and local strategies are deployed to cope with distur-
bances. This is « opportunistic bricolage » which is a way to offset
the disturbances and maintain the functioning of the system at
the lowest possible level of risk. It is a safety measure deployed
by human expertise, as well as the use of specific individual and
collective skills in real time, as previous studies in polar context
have already shown (Villemain and Lémonie, 2014; Villemain
and Godon, 2015).
Studies focused on extreme situation at work are poor in the
ergonomics approach, and even more so in polar context. Few
researches in polar conditions have been led in a logistics thematic
in arctic (Lièvre, 2007). At the present time, only our researches on
working conditions in the Antarctic context working are being car-
ried out with an ergonomics approach (Villemain and Lémonie,
2014; Villemain and Godon, 2015). To conduct research in such
conditions requires a specific methodology to collect data because
of the harsh conditions. Subsequently, the ethnographical method
is the most appropriate to the ground constraints (Rix-Lièvre and
Lièvre, 2010). These authors used this kind of method in order to
study ski polar expeditions in arctic through ethnological observa-
tions and interviews.
The context and motivations of this research are particular and
require to be specified. The French polar traverse, initiated in 1993,
was followed by the creation of the scientific French–Italian station
on the Antarctic continent called Concordia (situated to 1150 km
from the French station Dumont D’Urville (DDU) and opened in
2005). At that time, the objective was to design a freight and mate-
rial transport mode, in order to build the station, from DDU (car-
ried by boat until this station) to Concordia. Thus, the issue then
was a technical, material, technological, logistical and economical
challenge. The traverse has been explored more from a technical
point of view than a safety aspect, only guided by an experiential
or empirical observation. In Antarctica, the environment hostility
does not facilitate human activities, more particularly when those
take place outside such as mechanical task to repair machines.
During the traverse, temperatures can be below 50 °C in Febru-
ary. Thus, in this context, the smallest incident, if not managed
immediately, can bear heavy consequences and become dramatic
due to a limited medical assistance and the isolation. The vital
prognostic is quickly engaged.
The polar traverse could be defined as a set of vehicles in move-
ment in the polar continent, with a total autonomy. Eleven days are
necessary to reach Concordia from DDU. Three return-trips DDU–
Concordia are organized during the austral summer (between
November and February). The convoy is composed with about
ten persons, with a minimum of seven mechanics and one doctor,
three (snow trains), seven machines, three levelling machines, and
loads are consisting of fuel tanks and containers (see Diagram 1).
The logistical traverse has to carry freight to Concordia with both
quantitative and qualitative criteria, as quickly as possible and con-
suming as little fuel as possible. Today, twenty-two years after the
first traverse, no human loss has been reported since the traverse
was set up.
During about twenty-three days for a return trip, traversers will
cross the white-ice desert living in a caravan and driving eleven
hours per day. The traverse will be punctuated with mechanical
incidents considered as unexpected events. All raiders know that
incidents will happen during the traverse. Thus, in that way, we
can consider that such situations are not unforeseen. It is however
impossible to determine which kind of incident, when (in bad
weather conditions), neither how and which consequence such sit-
uations will entail (pieces to repair or not? Know-how or experi-
ence to face the event?) nor where exactly in the convoy, which
material, etc. In this regard, such events can be considered as
unforeseen... Everybody knows that this will have incidents, but
nobody knows exactly which ones. The real risk rests more in
the incident conditions per se than concerning the unforeseen
event in its current form.
Thus, in this context, the goal of the research deals with the sys-
tem capabilities to withstand shocks or unexpected events, and to
face harsh conditions every year, in order to answer the question
regarding strategies of organizational resilience used to ensure
the safety in a productive system. In the case of the traverse, ‘‘un-
foreseen” can be considered as a risky situation, jeopardizing the
traverse group during a limited period of time, thus calling on
the resilience abilities of this system. What is the nature of the
unforeseen situations on the traverse? What solutions can be
found? What strategies of organizational resilience can be
deployed? To investigate these questions, we rely on the operative
logic to manage risks during the traverses when unexpected events
occurred. An explanatory study was conducted over three com-
plete traverses (return trips) from which we gathered in situ data
in real and dynamic situation to understand how the unforeseen
events were managed, ensuring the organizational resilience of
the system. Firstly, an analysis of the unforeseen events will be
presented, as well as the solutions offered. Secondly, a single tra-
verse will be used to present a case study to understand the role
of the operators and the organization to act in the management
of unexpected events and strategies deployed.
2. Method
2.1. Tools and procedure
The methodology used was, firstly, aimed at describing and
characterizing the unforeseen events on the polar traverse and,
secondly, at conducting ergonomic analysis of operators’ activities
when the unforeseen situation occurred in particular. The method-
ology chosen was to analyze immediately operators’ activity in
unforeseen and natural situation during the traverse and their
interventions by means of observations in so far as, in such situa-
tions, the event is not necessarily known and neither are the tech-
nicians who are likely to intervene. As mentioned by De La Garza
(2000), troubleshooting activities, by nature unannounced, make
it impossible to define accurate observation conditions. Conse-
quently, the ergonomic analysis of operators’ interventions only
concerned the three polar traverses studied. Nevertheless, particu-
lar attention was paid, whenever possible, to the potential transfer
of this methodology to other risky environments.
Using both à quantitative and a qualitative approach, data were
gathered over a 3-year period from 2012 to 2015. Participating eth-
nological observations were carried out from immersion work
(note taking, films, photos). On board the outward and return trips
of the convoys, the goal was to experience the traverse from the
inside, (a) to understand exactly what unforeseen event referred
to (the nature of unforeseen events), (b) to access proposed solu-
tions without hindering the work in progress and (c) to understand
the various actions undertaken during the traverse which could
impact the management of unforeseen events and strategies of
organizational resilience employed by operators. The methods
used were the following: (1) firstly, objective and quantitative data
relating to the unforeseen events encountered were identified, in
order to proceed to a categorization of events (Amalberti, 1996).
2 A. Villemain, P. Godon / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Please cite this article in press as: Villemain, A., Godon, P. Toward a resilient organization: The management of unexpected hazard on the polar traverse.
Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.008